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National Archives<\/span>A map indicates the current territory of the state of Acre, then designated as \u201clitigious region.\u201dNational Archives<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n From a similar perspective, historian Marcelo Cheche Galves of the State University of Maranh\u00e3o (UEMA) observes that particularly during the nineteenth century, the historical narrative prized a view of the country’s territorial unity. As an example, he points to the writings of the Brazilian historian, military officer, and diplomat Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen (1816\u20131878), who promoted a vision of Brazil as the \u201cheir of Portugal\u201d and Brazilian Independence as the result of a \u201crift within the Portuguese royal family.” The diplomat, historian, and bibliophile Manuel de Oliveira Lima (1867\u20131928) even used the expression \u201cfriendly divorce\u201d when referring to Brazil’s Independence. \u201cThese ideas formed the foundations of our historiography, creating echoes throughout the development of this field of knowledge,\u201d says Galves.<\/p>\n In the 1970s, as a result of studies such as those by historian Carlos Guilherme Mota from USP, this perspective began to change. Mota began to analyze Brazil’s Independence based on elements such as how Enlightenment ideas were appropriated within the emancipationist projects of local settlers, maintaining that Brazil, even in the 1970s, was dependent on European metropolises. This approach was further explored with the research of historians Maria Odila da Silva Leite in the 1970s and Istv\u00e1n Jancs\u00f3 (1938\u20132010), also from USP, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Both argued that we need to think about \u201cthe independences\u201d of Brazil in the plural. \u201cIn 1972, the year that the 150th<\/sup> anniversary of the emancipation was celebrated, the military government [1964\u20131985] hijacked the occasion to assert that Dom Pedro I had given Brazil its political independence and the military its economic independence,\u201d points out Galves.<\/p>\n Wikimedia Commons<\/span>Equestrian statues of Hispanic American independence leaders: Sim\u00f3n Bol\u00edvar in Caracas, Venezuela\u2026Wikimedia Commons<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n The Maranh\u00e3o historian is one of the researchers who examined the diverse origins of the Independence process. In his view, the autonomy project created by Dom Pedro I served the interests of provinces such as Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and S\u00e3o Paulo while giving short shrift to the demands of other provinces. Regional wars broke out as a result, in opposition to the new imperial government’s plans, including the Farroupilha Revolution (1835\u20131845), in the province of S\u00e3o Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul; the Cabanagem revolt (1835\u20131840), in Gr\u00e3o-Par\u00e1; and the Sabinada uprising (1837\u20131838), in Bahia. \u201cIn Maranh\u00e3o, the population identified more with Portugal than with the Royal Court of Rio de Janeiro,\u201d he notes. \u201cAlthough the Court’s project was the winner, it was not the only movement.\u201d<\/p>\n Geographer Manoel Fernandes de Sousa Neto, from USP, recalls that Gr\u00e3o-Par\u00e1 and Maranh\u00e3o existed as separate states from Brazil until the beginning of the 1820s, when each region signed a treaty to join with the project designed by the government of Dom Pedro I. Acre, a region that had belonged to Bolivia and Peru, lived with armed conflicts for years and was only annexed to Brazil in 1903 after the signing of the Treaty of Petr\u00f3polis. \u201cUntil the beginning of the twentieth century, Brazil conquered territories, while Hispanic America was marked by a process of territorial disaggregation from the former Spanish domains,\u201d Galves says.<\/p>\n Based on research developed by geographer and social scientist Antonio Carlos Robert de Moraes (1954\u20132015), Sousa Neto argues that, since its Independence, the nation has invested in forming what he calls a \u201cterritorial savings account.\u201d \u201cThose in power fought to incorporate the northern regions as a way of having at their command territorial assets that could be economically exploited as the nation developed and demanded natural resources to modernize,\u201d he argues, contending that the same logic underlies the current challenges involving the devastation of the Amazon rainforest for illegal mining activities and soy plantations.<\/p>\n Wikimedia Commons<\/span>\u2026and Jos\u00e9 de San Mart\u00edn in Buenos Aires, ArgentinaWikimedia Commons<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n Considering the plurality of interests and conflicts that existed between the Brazilian provinces during the process of gaining Independence, another central question has mobilized scientific research around the theme: “After all, why didn’t Brazil break apart?” There is no consensus in the answers that result from analyses of various historical subjects, one of them being slavery.<\/p>\n Although each had its own individual, specific historical contexts and motivations, some rebellions within the national territory during the Independence process had certain demands in common, including provincial autonomy over tax payments, the improvement of economic problems and the presence of Portuguese citizens in administrative positions. In addition, most of them did not have antislavery programs and, therefore, did not enfranchise the enslaved, making any possibility of radicalization unfeasible. \u201cThis is why, after the insurgent movements were defeated, the ruling elites in provinces such as S\u00e3o Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia renegotiated relations with the imperial government so that their demands could be partially met without affecting the slave system, which was at that time central to the country’s economic activities,\u201d proposes historian Rafael Marquese, from USP. Marquese built his argument on the thinking of two Brazilian political scientists and historians, Jos\u00e9 Murilo de Carvalho from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and Luiz Felipe de Alencastro from the S\u00e3o Paulo School of Economics at Funda\u00e7\u00e3o Getulio Vargas (EESP-FGV). Marquese explains that in the eighteenth century, Portuguese America had 18 captaincies, whose markets were integrated through mining activities. \u201cSlavery existed in every region under white colonial rule and structured the relationships of society. Despite being a world fraught with tensions, the slave system created the bond that formed the Brazilian state because it produced a uniform social landscape and united the elites around a common interest, which was the maintenance of slavery,\u201d Marquese says.<\/p>\n Wikimedia Commons<\/span>A portrait of the Mexican general Agust\u00edn de Iturbide, who fought against the insurgencies for Independence, but later facilitated an agreement among the elites that led to Mexico\u2019s IndependenceWikimedia Commons<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n In Hispanic America, however, there were several types of differing conditions, explains Prado. There were fewer enslaved Africans living in Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay, while in Colombia, Venezuela, Haiti, and Cuba, the subjugated population was larger. \u201cThe exception was the case of the French colonies in Saint Domingue, the future Haiti. After the abolition of slavery by the French Revolution [1789\u20131799], the slaves became the leaders and agents of the conquest of independence, even expelling the whites from their territory,\u201d explains the historian. \u201cCuba, on the other hand, remained a Spanish colony longer, and only became independent in 1898. The elites had feared a rebellion like the one that took place in Haiti, and combined forces with their colonial power to guarantee the slave system was maintained,\u201d she adds.<\/p>\n Notwithstanding the search to provide nuance to the antagonism in analyses of Latin American and Brazilian independence, after the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807 by the troops of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769\u20131821), the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal took different paths. King Dom Jo\u00e3o VI (1767\u20131826) decided to leave Portugal and settle in Brazil; Ferdinand VII (1784\u20131833), the King of Spain, was taken prisoner in France and watched as the French Emperor’s brother Joseph I (1768\u20131844) was placed on his throne. \u201cWith the arrest of the Spanish king, there was internal resistance against the French monarch. Spanish America began to see strong political agitation questioning loyalty to the new metropolitan government,\u201d Prado says.<\/p>\n Library of the Congress<\/span>Haitian rebels hang a landowner during the Haitian Revolution (1791\u20131804)Library of the Congress<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n In the case of Brazil, the historian believes that the transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court to Rio de Janeiro contributed to maintaining the idea of territorial cohesion. \u201cThis attitude was reinforced when, years later, Dom Jo\u00e3o’s own son led the move to Independence,\u201d she emphasizes. In research conducted on the minutes of municipal councils and newspapers from various provinces \u2014 as part of a study financed by FAPESP \u2014 historian Jean Marcel Carvalho Fran\u00e7a, from the Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), Franca campus, found that Dom Pedro I was recognized as a leader and received popular support even in small, inland communities. One of the results of the study, completed in 2021, was the creation of a database open to other researchers. \u201cDespite the rebel movements, in general there was an atmosphere of elation surrounding the figure of the prince, who was a collaborator in the process of consolidating the national territory,\u201d says Fran\u00e7a, who points to texts published in the newspaper O Espelho<\/em>, which circulated in Rio de Janeiro between 1821 and 1823.<\/p>\n According to Prado, from USP, another aspect that defines the destiny of Hispanic America is related to the fact that during colonization, Spain’s administrative system differed from the Portuguese model. The region was organized into four viceroyalties, namely, Peru, whose seat was in Lima; New Spain, headquartered in Mexico City; New Granada, in Bogot\u00e1; and Rio de la Plata, in Buenos Aires. In addition, there were four general captaincies: Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, and Guatemala. \u201cThese elements of the administrative division reported to a greater power, the Spanish Crown,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n New York Public Library<\/span>A portrait of Fran\u00e7ois-Dominique Toussaint L\u2019Ouverture (1743\u20131803), leader of the Haitian RevolutionNew York Public Library<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n Historian Gabriela Pellegrino Soares, from USP, clarifies that initially the viceroyalties were loyal to the King of Spain, who was in prison, but little by little, this attitude gave way to projects aimed toward autonomy and rupture with colonial powers. \u201cThus, the regions began to organize revolutionary armies to break with Spain. In 1814, Napoleon suffered defeat, and King Ferdinand VII was restored as monarch of the Spanish Empire. Then, Spain sent a large army to contain the dissident movements that were in progress,\u201d details the historian. Since the rebel groups were numerous and the army had a limited number of soldiers, Spain first mobilized its troops to fight insurgencies in the viceroyalty of New Granada, which were led by revolutionary general Simon Bolivar (1783\u20131830). \u201cHispanic America was marked by armed conflicts that swept the continent between 1810 and 1825,\u201d observes Prado.<\/p>\n The historian points out that the last bastion of the Spanish Crown was the Viceroyalty of Peru, which corresponds to the current territory of Peru and Bolivia, where the Viceroy managed to resist the revolutionaries until the arrival of General Jos\u00e9 de San Mart\u00edn (1778\u20131850) and his troops. San Mart\u00edn had been a major player in the struggle for Argentine Independence, which was consolidated in 1816, and crossed the Andes with 5,000 soldiers to reach the region. Peru became independent in 1821 and Bolivia in 1825. \u201cWhile Bol\u00edvar is recognized as a hero of Independence in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia, San Mart\u00edn plays the same role in Argentina and Peru, having supported the liberation of Chile,\u201d she points out.<\/p>\n The indigenous groups, Soares observes, reacted in differing ways to the campaigns for independence. In the Andes region, from Colombia to Chile, the indigenous peoples were Christianized peasants who maintained close relations with the colonial power. \u201cAt the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Mapuche people \u2014 who lived in the region that is now south-central Chile \u2014 were against the emancipation projects because they had signed peace treaties with Spain that could be threatened by a change of government,\u201d she explains. On the other hand, when Argentina emancipated itself, the new government had the news translated and disseminated in various indigenous languages. \u201cIt was officially communicated to these populations that there was a new regime,\u201d she adds, noting that members of the revolutionary armies knew the languages of the native peoples and used these languages as a way of engaging them in the struggles for emancipation.<\/p>\n Theubet de Beauchamp\u2009\/\u2009Wikimedia Commons<\/span>Iturbide receives the keys to Mexico City after it gained IndependenceTheubet de Beauchamp\u2009\/\u2009Wikimedia Commons<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n In Mexico, it was up to a representative of the Catholic Church, the parish priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla (1753\u20131811), to lead from 1810 onward the first revolutionary movement, putting an end to the colonial relationship and calling on the indigenous people to rise up against the Spaniards. \u201cThe priest carried banners with images of the Virgin of Guadalupe, who had indigenous features,\u201d explains Soares. The insurgency suffered a violent repression, and Hidalgo, even with the support of a large people’s army, did not escape execution. \u201cThe rebel movements continued throughout the country until 1821, when General Agust\u00edn de Iturbide [1783\u20131824], who had previously fought against the insurgencies for independence, facilitated an agreement among the elites in order for Mexico to become Independent from the Spanish Crown,\u201d says Prado.<\/p>\n In the case of Brazil, Sousa Neto, at USP, believes that the state’s guarantee that the elites could continue to appropriate land, own large estates, and count on slave labor made the country’s cohesion possible. \u201cToday, we form a territorial state, but do we form a nation?\u201d the geographer asks. Sousa Neto adds that Brazil was not only invented symbolically but also materially through military, political, and economic processes. \u201cThe Brazilian state, built during the 1800s, made use of the geographical myth of territorial untouchability to maintain a strong political center around the figure of the emperor, expressed in an exemplary way in the military actions that quelled the regional revolts that took place during the nineteenth century,\u201d the geographer says. According to his interpretation, we are a society that holds territorial cohesion as a central element of our identity, a narrative constructed in contrast to that of Spanish America, seen as a place of warring factions, civil wars, economic regression, and anarchy, while Brazil was the country of unity, order, and civilization. \u201cThe Brazilian flag even includes blue as a symbol of nobility and yellow to represent gold, while green refers to the Portuguese royal family of Bragan\u00e7a, a distinctly different iconography than used in the flags of Hispanic countries, which allude to movements of liberation and revolutionary processes,\u201d the geographer says.<\/p>\n Prado recalls that in Venezuela, for example, national identity was formed around the figure of Bol\u00edvar. She adds that in Colombia, although society recognizes the important role played by Bol\u00edvar in its history, the legal scholar, military officer, and politician Francisco Jos\u00e9 de Paula Santander (1792\u20131840) became their model for future liberal politicians. \u201cThe name ‘Latin America’ was invented in the nineteenth century and, from the end of the century on, a Latin American identity was under construction, as juxtaposed to the Anglo-Americans of the United States,\u201d the researcher concludes.<\/p>\n Project<\/strong>![\"\"](\"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/003-069_especial-br200_318-2-800.jpg\")
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\nWritings on the new worlds: A history of the construction of moral values in the Portuguese language (n\u00ba 13\/14786-6<\/a>); Grant Mechanism<\/strong> Thematic Project; Principal Investigator<\/strong> Jean Marcel Carvalho Fran\u00e7a (UNESP); Investment<\/strong> R$958,320.68.<\/p>\n