{"id":554574,"date":"2025-06-11T12:13:52","date_gmt":"2025-06-11T15:13:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/?p=554574"},"modified":"2025-06-11T12:12:35","modified_gmt":"2025-06-11T15:12:35","slug":"disputed-territories","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/disputed-territories\/","title":{"rendered":"Disputed territories"},"content":{"rendered":"

The race for the exploration of minerals that have been dubbed critical for the energy transition is exacerbating existing socioenvironmental conflicts in the Brazilian mining and metals sector. These natural elements are needed to develop a low-carbon economy and to produce components used in the manufacture of batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines, and others. They are also largely used in activities not related to the energy transition. A total of 101,000 people across 15 states were impacted by transition mineral extraction, which led to 380 confrontations in the country between 2020 and 2023. The Amazonia Legal region, a collective of nine Brazilian states, had the most disputes, with 46.3% of incidents. Individual analysis by state revealed that Par\u00e1 and Minas Gerais accounted for 66.7% of the clashes. The data were collated in a study published in August by the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Brazil, an initiative by researchers from institutions across the country, social movements, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).<\/p>\n

Another survey conducted by the same observatory in 2023 indicated that since 2020, legal and illegal extraction throughout the mineral sector has led to between 850 and 950 conflicts and affected approximately 1 million people per year. The document also shows that in 2022, the states of Minas Gerais (37.5%), Par\u00e1 (12%), and Alagoas (10.1%) reported the highest proportion of people affected by the disputes.<\/p>\n

One of the research authors, geographer Luiz Jardim Wanderley of Fluminense Federal University (UFF), stated that conflicts are considered the reactions of those affected by social and environmental impacts and by situations of violence, including working under slave-like conditions, rapes, accidents, threats, attempted murders, and deaths. Wanderley states, \u201cDuring the pandemic, the mineral sector registered countless labor violations for not having adopted efficient policies to safeguard the health of workers\u201d. The \u201cAnnual Report of the International Council on Mining and Metals\u201d indicates that in Brazil, 43 employees of companies associated with the entity died as a result of workplace accidents in 2021. The figures for 2019 and 2020 were 287 and 44, respectively.<\/p>\n

Wanderley explains that to be included in the mapping, the conflict must have given rise to reactions among the population, including legal proceedings, protests, letters of repudiation, or grievances published in newspapers. He specifies that \u201cConfrontations not causing this type of response are not counted in our figures\u201d. In the survey studies, data from the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), which has been recording agrarian conflicts since 1985, and the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI), both entities of the Catholic Church, were analyzed. Data on this type of incident that were recorded in documents produced by NGOs, grievances manifested by social movements, press news, and other means were also used.<\/p>\n

The study of minerals needed for energy transition covered conflicts involving 31 elements, including aluminum, barium, boron, cadmium, cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese, niobium, and nickel. According to information from the Brazilian National Mining Agency (ANM), the extraction value of these minerals between 2013 and 2022 rose from R$27.7 billion to R$38.6 billion, resulting in real-term (inflation-deducted) growth of 39%. In the same period, the mineral sector numbers as a whole increased from R$243 billion to R$266 billion in deflated values\u2014a 9.3% rise.<\/p>\n

\"\"

Alessandro Falco \/ Bloomberg via Getty Images <\/span>Residents of Barcarena (PA) protesting in 2018 against process waste discharge into the local river by an aluminum refineryAlessandro Falco \/ Bloomberg via Getty Images <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

The conflicts that have been identified in this survey may overlap: the most prevalent type covers land-use disputes, which are involved in 59.2% of incidents, followed by conflicts over water access (39.4%), health issues (16.4%) and labor disputes (12.4%), which explains Wanderley. Energy transition minerals copper and bauxite were the most significant causes, accounting for 25.3% of the incidents each. Moreover, the market value of these elements escalated between 2020 and 2023. \u201cThe data suggest that there is a correlation between the intensity of mineral extraction, its sale value, and the incidence of conflicts,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n

Barcarena (PA), Cana\u00e3 dos Caraj\u00e1s (PA), and Cra\u00edbas (AL) occupy the top three spots on the list of towns and cities with the highest number of disputes involving the mining of important elements for the energy transition. \u201cThe overall trend is a rise in per capita revenues across municipalities hosting mining activity. However, social development and a reduction in inequalities have not gone hand-in-hand with these increases,\u201d says Jo\u00e3o Marcio Palheta of the Federal University of Par\u00e1 (UFPA), who did not participate in the study.<\/p>\n

Predominant in Barcarena is the extraction and processing of bauxite, which is used in the production of aluminum. In 2018, local people complained of tailings (mining waste) leaking from a dam, which contaminated rivers and igarap\u00e9s (tropical creeks). The primary mining activity in Cana\u00e3 dos Caraj\u00e1s is iron and copper ore extraction, which has displaced local communities. \u201cThis situation generates conflicts over land losses and impacts lifestyles among communities, primarily indigenous and riverside dwellers,\u201d says Palheta. The municipality is also a focal point for labor disputes with mining companies; the region is home to the largest iron-ore extraction projects in the history of Brazilian-founded multinational giant Vale, with an output capacity of 120 million tons per year.<\/p>\n

Palheta studies four municipalities hosting mining projects in Par\u00e1 State: Barcarena, Parauapebas, and Paragominas, as well as Cana\u00e3 dos Caraj\u00e1s. He states that the municipalities with the highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Brazil frequently cover locations with large-scale industrial or extractive projects, such as those in Parauapebas. Palheta reports, \u201cNevertheless, as occurs across other towns and cities with these characteristics, Parauapebas is blighted by poverty and lacks basic sanitation\u201d.<\/p>\n

He believes this to be due to a lack of transparency in the use of funds from the Financial Compensation for Mineral Exploration (CFEM), which is levied on mining profits. \u201cCFEM resources can only be invested in healthcare and education, but there is a lack of control mechanisms to identify where the money is in fact spent,\u201d states the geographer. On the basis of reports published by the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Brazil, the Municipal Human Development Index (IDH-M) falls short of the national average in 27 of the 50 municipal areas most mined in Brazil. With respect to the Gini index, which measures inequalities, 34 of these 50 municipalities have worse indicators than the world\u2019s 14th<\/sup> most unequal country, the Republic of the Congo.<\/p>\n

\"\"

Nelson Almeida \/ AFP Via Getty Images<\/span>A copper mine in Cana\u00e3 dos Caraj\u00e1s (PA), one of the municipalities with the highest number of conflicts associated with energy-transition mineralsNelson Almeida \/ AFP Via Getty Images<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

According to the organization, the groups that are most affected by energy-transition mineral exploration are small rural landowners (involved in 23.9% of occurrences), mining company workers (12.1%), and indigenous peoples (9.8%), whereas international mining corporations (46.3%) and medium-sized national companies (33.6%) predominated among organizations implicated in conflicts. \u201cThe rising value of energy-transition minerals increasingly attracts smaller mining operations to locations with little background of mining exploration, further complicating the situation,\u201d says UFF\u2019s Wanderley.<\/p>\n

His observation is backed by economist Beatriz Macchione Saes of the Federal University of S\u00e3o Paulo (UNIFESP). On the basis of research into the relationships among economic development, mining, and conflicts triggered by the activity, she provides an example of the situation in the Jequitinhonha Valley, Minas Gerais State. Since 1991, the region has received projects for the exploration of lithium, a metal used, among other applications, in electric car batteries; however, an increasing number of mining companies are interested in taking action. She notes, \u201cFour companies are currently seeking approval for lithium exploration initiatives in the region, and their possible installation may worsen conflicts with local communities\u201d.<\/p>\n

The production engineer Bruno Milanez of the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF) and a specialist in mineral sector corporations explained that after the 1990s, these companies began to adopt practices to mitigate socioenvironmental impacts. The researcher provides the example that, up to 1989, mining companies operating in Oriximin\u00e1, state of Par\u00e1, discharged their extraction waste directly into the rivers in a procedure accepted in those days by the Brazilian State. He notes, \u201cThose companies are still trying to remedy the damage resulting from this activity to the present day\u201d. In the 2000s, mining corporations installed dams to contain tailings; these days, this waste can be dry-stacked after passing through filtration systems. \u201cHowever, even with reduced impacts, the negative socioenvironmental effects cannot be escaped,\u201d he states. Milanez reports that some companies recognize the issue and no longer use the term \u2018sustainable mining,\u2019 noting that \u201cthe most common concept currently used by the sector is \u2018responsible mining.\u2019 Companies acknowledge that negative impacts are inherent in their activities, but maintain that damage reduction strategies can be adopted\u201d.<\/p>\n

In a statement issued by email, the aluminum multinational Hydro Group noted that operations carried out by companies receiving their investments in the country are monitored and audited, with the commitment \u201cto being good neighbors to communities.\u201d One of these operations is Minera\u00e7\u00e3o Paragominas in Par\u00e1, which has adopted a technique for returning inert bauxite mining tailings to brownfield areas. The company states that this method enables reconstruction of the original land topography and reduction of erosion risk, minimizing environmental impacts. Multinational Anglo American, which extracts diamonds, mercury, copper, and nickel, explained via email that, in 2019, it created a plan to improve education and health care systems among host communities in Brazil.<\/p>\n

Saes, of UNIFESP, says that the commodity boom between 2020 and 2014 was marked by a worsening of the incidence of this type of conflict in the country. During that period, Brazil recorded a considerable increase in the demand for primary goods and raw materials, including minerals. \u201cIron ore was one of the most in-demand commodities in the international market, with exports soaring from 100 million tons in 2000 to 300 million tons in 2015,\u201d she adds, going on to say that the rise in conflicts is proportional to the expansion of mining activities.<\/p>\n

In the first decades of the twenty-first century, two of Brazil\u2019s largest environmental disasters, caused by iron ore extraction, took place. In 2015, a dam collapse at the mining complex of Samarco (controlled by Vale and Anglo-Australian giant BHP Billiton) in the region of Mariana (MG) killed 19 people and spilled 39 million m\u00b3 of toxic sludge, affecting the Doce River and several communities across the states of Minas Gerais and Esp\u00edrito Santo over more than 600 kilometers (km). According to the Atlas of the Brazilian mineral problem (Atlas do problema mineral brasileiro<\/em>), published in 2023, the triumvirate formed by Samarco, Vale, and BHP Billiton was responsible for the greatest number of conflicts between 2004 and 2020, with a total of 462 conflicts occurring during that period.<\/p>\n

In 2019, the collapse of a Vale dam in Brumadinho (MG) killed 270 people and contaminated the Paraopeba River basin, which is 510 km long. In an emailed communication, Vale stated that R$37.7 billion was earmarked for remediation of the damage caused by the disaster, with 70% of this total applied to date. The company further states that mechanisms have been in place since 2023 to hear about the needs of affected populations.<\/p>\n

\"\"

Victor Moriyama \/ Bloomberg via Getty Images<\/span>Photo from 2019 showing the destruction caused by the Vale dam collapse in Brumadinho (MG)Victor Moriyama \/ Bloomberg via Getty Images<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

In Mariana, the reparation process undertaken by Samarco allocated R$37 billion for reparation and compensation of damage arising from the disaster, of which R$17.48 billion has been paid out in indemnities and emergency financial aid. In a statement sent by email, the company affirmed that the resettlement of impacted communities was 85% complete. Despite these agreements, victims are seeking recourse under the UK legal system, as BHP, one of Samarco\u2019s controllers, is Anglo-Australian in origin. In 2023, a London law firm filed a damage indemnity claim to the value of R$230 billion for 700,000 victims of the disaster.<\/p>\n

A researcher examining the development of these reparation efforts, sociologist Raquel Oliveira, of the Study Group into Environmental Matters at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), notes that the process has led to internal tensions between the affected communities. Oliveira explained that prior to the disaster, many families shared their lands with their relatives. Grandparents, parents, and children, for example, would build their houses on the same smallholding, maintained as inheritance land. She adds, \u201cNonetheless, these reparation measures do not fully take into account the complexity and dynamics of these land arrangements, leading to revision of domestic agreements and hampering the recognition of new family units\u201d.<\/p>\n

Anthropologist Gabriela de Paula Marcurio, who is conducting doctoral research at UNIFESP with a fellowship from FAPESP, highlights another issue\u2014the mining companies implicated in these disasters not considering relevant losses by the afflicted communities when they cataloged the harm caused by their activities: forced changes in lifestyle and the time spent managing problems caused by the dam collapse, such as attending meetings. As part of her doctoral work, Marcurio is researching the influx of companies looking to exploit iron ore, copper, and phosphate from the region of Juazeiro, in the sert<\/em>\u00e3<\/em>o<\/em> (badlands) of Bahia State, an area in which the mineral frontier is expanding. She states that the people of the area start to feel the effects even before the formal installation of a mining company. \u201cSmall-scale farmers have complained about the presence of drones, and outsiders walking around their properties without consulting them,\u201d she says.<\/p>\n

Milanez, of the UFJF, emphasizes that the Brazilian subsoil is a federal government asset; thus, people\u2019s houses may be expropriated to enable projects in the sector to progress. Furthermore, according to ANM, those who obtain authorization to install a mine in a certain location will hold exclusive rights to exploit the land in question. This engineer states that \u201cIn many instances, these factors will put conflicts in a situation characterized by an imbalance of power\u201d.<\/p>\n

With an end to articulating and disseminating strategies to constrain or prohibit mining in certain areas, a group of researchers, social movements, local communities, and NGOs created the platform Territ<\/em>\u00f3<\/em>rios Livres de Minera\u00e7\u00e3<\/em>o \u2013 TLM<\/em> (Mining-Free Lands) in 2022. This repository carries information on steps taken in line with municipal legislation, plebiscites, and public consultations that were successful in putting the brakes on undesirable projects in vulnerable areas, exemplified by the town of Muria\u00e9 (MG), whose residents thwarted the installation of a bauxite exploration project in the district of Belis\u00e1rio in the surrounding area of Serra do Brigadeiro State Park. \u201cPublic pressure caused local councilors to approve of Law Bill 192, classifying the region as water heritage, and impeding mining activity in the location,\u201d Milanez concludes.<\/p>\n

Published in September 2024<\/p>\n

Project<\/strong>
\nMemories of the Pastoral Land Commission of Juazeiro regarding mining in the semi-arid region of Bahia (n\u00b0 23\/02480-1<\/a>); Grant Mechanism<\/strong> Doctoral Fellowship; Supervisor<\/strong> Jorge Luiz Mattar Villela (UFSCar); Beneficiary<\/strong> Gabriela de Paula Marcurio; Investment<\/strong> R$342,357.84.<\/p>\n

Scientific articles
\n<\/strong>MAGNO, L. et al<\/em>. Territ\u00f3rios corporativos da minera\u00e7\u00e3o: Barragens de rejeito, reconfigura\u00e7\u00e3o espacial e deslocamento compuls\u00f3rio em Minas Gerais<\/a>. Revista NERA<\/strong>, 26 (66). 2023.
\n<\/strong>PALHETA, J. M. et al<\/em>. Din\u00e2mica territorial dos grandes projetos de minera\u00e7\u00e3o em Barcarena no estado do Par\u00e1, regi\u00e3o Norte do Brasil<\/a>. Contribuciones a las ci\u00eancias sociales<\/strong>. 16(9). 2023.<\/p>\n

Reports<\/strong>
\nTransi\u00e7\u00e3o desigual: As viola\u00e7\u00f5es da extra\u00e7\u00e3o dos minerais para a transi\u00e7\u00e3o energ\u00e9tica no Brasil.<\/a> Comit\u00ea Nacional em Defesa dos Territ\u00f3rios Frente \u00e0 Minera\u00e7\u00e3o. Observat\u00f3rio dos Conflitos da Minera\u00e7\u00e3o no Brasil<\/strong>, 2024.
\n<\/strong>Conflitos da minera\u00e7\u00e3o no Brasil 2022: Relat\u00f3rio Anual. Comit\u00ea Nacional em Defesa dos Territ\u00f3rios Frente \u00e0 Minera\u00e7\u00e3o<\/a>. Observat\u00f3rio dos Conflitos da Minera\u00e7\u00e3o no Brasil<\/strong>. 2023.
\n<\/strong>Atlas do problema mineral brasileiro. Comit\u00ea Nacional em Defesa dos Territ\u00f3rios Frente \u00e0 Minera\u00e7\u00e3o<\/a>. Observat\u00f3rio dos Conflitos da Minera\u00e7\u00e3o no Brasil<\/strong>. 2023.<\/p>\n

Book
\n<\/strong>MARCURIO, G. P. A m\u00e1quina do terror \u2012 A luta das pessoas atingidas pelo desastre da Samarco em Mariana<\/strong> (in press).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Mineral extraction for energy transition aggravates land possession and water access conflicts in Brazil","protected":false},"author":601,"featured_media":554583,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[159],"tags":[],"coauthors":[1600],"class_list":["post-554574","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-science"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/554574","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/601"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=554574"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/554574\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":554732,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/554574\/revisions\/554732"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/554583"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=554574"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=554574"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=554574"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistapesquisa.fapesp.br\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=554574"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}